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Abstract: - This work describes the development of a non-invasive and low-cost process that allows for the 
improvement of the energy theft inspection routine, increasing the field inspection team productivity and 
reducing the customer's embarrassment in cases where no irregularity is found. This new process is based on 
the development of an electronic Ah meter device that can be installed on the customer's pole input connections 
to the power lines. Using the recorded Ah value in the device, it is possible to estimate, within a margin of 
error, the energy consumption of the customer during a small period, typically one week. This energy value is 
compared to the customer's regular energy meter reading for the same period. A comprehensive statistical study 
performed with a database of more than 80000 customers in distribution area of the utility company AES 
Eletropaulo in São Paulo, Brazil concludes that the comparison between these readings can clearly indicate 
when tampered or defective meters are found. 
 
Key-Words: Electrical energy theft, fraud inspection routine, electricity tariffs, sustainable development, 
emergent countries, energy efficiency, illegal energy consumers. 
 
1 Introduction 
A major problem that electricity utilities 
companies in emergent countries face is the loss of 
revenue caused by non-technical losses, which are 
originated mainly by fraud or theft of electricity [1]. 
These figures are extremely high in Brazil, and in 
2007 represented a loss of approximately 20 billion 
US dollars, or about 15% of total energy distributed 
in the country, which is equivalent to the energy 
generated by the biggest Brazilian hydroelectric 
power plant, Itaipu [2]. This problem is a common 
issue in other emergent countries, and finding 
solutions to this problem is of fundamental 
importance to achieve a sustainable development 
growth in these economies [3]. 
The economic losses caused by energy theft 
impacts drastically in the company's capacity to 
improve the quality of the electrical energy supply 
or for extending the electrification process in low 
income and rural areas. Due to the large number of 
illegal consumers, the cost of electricity becomes 
very high and both genuine customers and the utility 
companies are responsible for paying for this energy 
theft [4,5,6,7]. 
Also, the techniques used to illegal tapping of 
electricity lead to electric shocks and is not unusual 
to have people killed in these attempts of making an 
illegal connection [8]. To reduce these non-technical 
losses, the electrical utility companies have been 
investing heavily in efforts to control and combat 
tampered and illegal connections, using estimation 
techniques or performing incessant inspection of 
their wire networks [9, 10, 11]. However, the 
practical results are still very modest, despite the 
enormous effort [12]. 
To illustrate this scenario, even though AES 
Eletropaulo, the largest electricity utility in Brazil 
[2], has done a tremendous effort in this area, 
investing about 65 million US dollars per year, the 
level of its non-technical losses had a modest 
reduction, from 5.0% to 4.9%, when comparing the 
year of 2007 with the first quarter of 2008. 
Increasing the efficiency of the combat actions 
against non-technical losses and optimizing the 
relation between inspection costs versus the revenue 
recovered through these actions is a major challenge 
for power distribution companies [12]. The 
traditional tools of information technology (IT), 
although very helpful in order to identify potential 
situations of energy theft, do not offer an efficient 
solution to the problem. 
Even the most sophisticated available software 
based on databases analysis provide only a marginal 
return, since the success ratio (number of 
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irregularities detected to number of inspection 
realized) by this kind of analysis is still very low. 
Nowadays, in the city of São Paulo, only 12% of the 
executed inspections selected by the IT are of 
customers who actually present any problem of 
tampering or anomaly in their installations. 
The current procedure to investigate a customer 
is to send a well experienced electrician unit to the 
destination provided by the IT-based smart system 
to perform a physical check of the installation. 
These conventional inspections take a long time, are 
expensive and difficult to perform, since the 
operation requires high skilled professionals, 
sophisticated tools (like flexible fiber optics bore 
scopes), and also require permission from the 
customers to access the local of inspection. 
The typical procedure of installing a regular 
energy meter before the customer's meter is 
generally not effective because the customer can 
easily notice that its installation is under 
investigation and, thus, take the necessary actions to 
disable the theft scheme. 
Therefore, it is necessary to evaluate solutions 
which involve development of new technologies and 
equipment as well as new techniques to review the 
working procedures in order to increase the system 




2 Requirements for developing a pre-
inspection routine procedure 
Part of this work was dedicated to perform a 
statistic analysis of parameters which will allow for 
the establishment of a low-cost non-invasive pre-
inspection routine procedure capable of 
substantially increasing the success rate of 
conventional inspections. This pre-inspection 
routine will precede the conventional inspection and 
it shall indicate if there is a potential electric energy 
theft or an anomaly in the meter of the customer 
under investigation. Then it is decided if a 
conventional inspection is likely to be successful 
and justified in that particular case which has 
already been selected by the regular IT software. 
A very small electronic device estimates the 
customer energy consumption during a sample 
period, by measuring the electric current 
consumption in Ah. Based on the statistics of 
previous found frauds and the average values 
measured on each type of technical installation 
(Delta, single phase, 2 phases, 3 phases, etc.), and 
comparing the estimated energy consumption to the 
real consumption read for the same period in the 
utility regular energy meter, it is proposed a 
procedure to decide if the customers deserves to be 
physically inspected. 
For the success of the pre-inspection process, the 
equipment must attend the following characteristics: 
1. Easy installation and removal using an 
appropriated tool, allowing for a high 
productivity and a low-cost process; 
2. Precision current measurement, considering 
that only the electric current will be measured 
and the reference voltage will be assumed 
according to the type of the client network 
circuit; 
3. Fast download of measured data and 
performing the analysis and comparisons by 
an automated process; 
4. Operation in temperatures from -5oC to 65oC; 
5. Robustness, with hard-duty structure (to 
avoid violation) and reduced dimensions in 
order to be barely noticed by the customers; 
6. Has to be transported in lots of at least 30 
pieces in a motorcycle (in an appropriated 
box); 
7. Low production cost, allowing massive use; 
8. Desirable battery lifetime of one year. 
 
 
3 Current Status of Inspections 
To analyze the consumption behavior of detected 
energy theft and irregularities before and after the 
field regularization, a database from AES 
Eletropaulo containing 97833 customers selected by 
the IT software to be inspected, during the period of 
January 5th, 2009 to May 31st, 2010. 
This database includes the six months energy 
consumptions that occurred before the inspection, 
the consumption for the month of the inspection, 
and the next six months consumptions in kWh after 
the inspection. The database also shows the 
classification of inspections according to their 
results, as: 
a) HIT A = Anomaly; 
b) HIT F = Fraud; 
c) HIT O = in order;  
d) HIT N = Not inspected. 
The “Anomaly” is characterized by a defect in 
the meter, for example a worn-out part or a burn-out 
caused by a lightning falling on the power line. 
“Fraud” is characterized when any action of 
tampering with the meter is found, for example by 
blocking the meter moving parts or with a partial 
bypass of the meter. If after an inspection it was not 
found any kind of irregularity, it is classified as “in 
order”. 
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From the 97833 cases, only 81195 could be 
effectively inspected during this 16 months period. 
In the universe of inspected cases, 4976 (which 
represent approximately 6.13% of the database) 
were identified as frauds (some kind of tampering) 
and were regularized by the utility technicians. The 
anomalies represent 6946 cases, that is, 
approximately 8.56% of the data base. 
Therefore, approximately only 14.69% of 
inspections generate energy recovery or energy 
addition to the billing, and almost 70000 
unnecessary inspections were realized. With more 
than 5000 inspections per month and only circa of 
70 being successful, the cost/benefit ratio of the 
inspection activity is very low. However, the utility 
company cannot stop the inspection activity because 
it would send a wrong signal to the customers, who 
would feel more comfortable to practice the 






4 Establishing parameters to detect 
energy theft 
In order to create a pre-inspection process using 
a measurement device which allows for the 
identification of differences in the expected 
consumption, it is necessary to statistically identify 
the behavior of the energy consumption of the 
customers who were caught with a fraudulent 
installation. To obtain the data that represents the 
behavior of consumption before and after the field 
inspection, it was considered the cases in which 
there were three or more registers of energy 
consumption before and after the inspection. 
The database has 80601 cases that meet these 
conditions. For these cases, the mean and the 
median of the monthly energy consumption before 
and after the inspection were calculated. Plots of 
these variables are shown in Fig. 1 and Fig. 2. In 
these plots M0 is the month of the inspection and 
M-6 and M6 are, respectively, the 6th month before 
and after the inspection. 
The plots clearly show that, in cases of 
anomalies and fraud, an increase of consumption 
occurs after the inspection and meter regularization. 
In cases that were inspected and found “in order”, 
there were no significant differences before and 
after the inspection. However, in cases that were not 
yet inspected, there is a slight variation (tendency of 
consumption increase), probably indicating that in 




Fig. 1 Mean of the energy consumption for a 





Fig. 2 Median of the energy consumption for a 
period of six months before and six months after the 
inspection. 
 
It is also important to notice that in cases of fraud 
or anomaly, the consumption tends to decrease with 
time, but remains higher than during the period prior 
to the inspection. One of possible explanations for 
this phenomenon is that once the fraud or anomaly 
is regularized, the consumption starts to be read 
correctly and consequently the energy bill will be 
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energy efficiency habits and even changing the 
home's appliances to reduce the consumption. 
To clearly identify the change in power 
consumption behavior, three different 
methodologies were used: a) the step analysis; b) the 
comparison of consumption behavior before and 
after field regularization and c) the standard 
deviation analysis. 
The most common methodology for fraud or 
anomalies identification used by the utilities is the 
analysis of consumer behavior by seeking a 
variation to a lower consumption during a given 
period. Once identified this step, it is done a local 
inspection to measure the consumption, in parallel 
to the current measurement equipment, in order to 
confirm the anomaly or energy theft. 
This method, although very used and easily 
applied, has serious limitations, since the step of 
consumption can be masked by variation of the 
consumption behavior due to: 
• Climate seasonality which change 
consumption patterns; 
• Consumers life-cycle such as children leaving 
their parents homes; 
• Companies reducing production capacity; 
• Consumers adopting energy efficiency 
mechanisms such as changing incandescent 
light bulbs to compact fluorescent and 
acquiring new appliances that consume less 
energy, as it was seen during the Brazilian 
electricity rationing in the years of 2000 and 
2001. 
All these variations make it difficult to identify 
with precision a threshold for the step of 
consumption, and many of the inspections that occur 
in the field will not confirm the suspected fraud. For 
example, if a step decrease of 10% in the 
consumption is adopted as the threshold value for 
deciding to perform a physical inspection, 17.45% 
of the cases would have been missed. 
Observing the six months before the inspection 
which detected the fraud, it is found that none of the 
customers who were stealing energy showed 
consumption variations of more than 9.9%. Within 
the universe of anomalies found, a greater 
percentage of cases (23.91%) would be detected if 
the same criterion (step of 10%) was used. Thus, it 
is very difficult to identify fraud or anomalies 
simply by using the consumption step method. 
The second method to analyze changes in the 
consumptions behavior involves the creation of 
variables which compares the consumptions before 
and after the field regularization. In this study, four 
variables were created, considering the data of 3448 
cases of anomalies and 5170 cases of fraud with a 
consumption history of at least three months before 
and after field regularization: 
a) DELTAA16 - division of the consumption 
registered at the 6th month after the 
regularization by the consumption 
registered in the month which immediately 
precedes the inspection; 
b)  DELTAA116 - division of the consumption 
mean of the period of six months posterior to the 
inspection to the consumption registered in the 
month immediately preceding the inspection; 
c) DELTAA123- division of the consumption 
mean of the second and third months after the 
inspection (months of highest consumption) to 
the consumption registered in the month which 
immediately precedes the inspection; 
d) DELTAA12323 - division of consumption 
mean of  the second and third months after the 
inspection to the consumption mean of the three 
months immediately prior to the inspection. 
The different divisions shows that, in cases of 
fraud, when comparing the month before the 
inspection with the 6th month after the inspection, 
the change in consumption patterns occurs with 
minor differences. However, when comparing the 
month prior to the inspection with the average of the 
six months after the inspection, 95% of cases show a 
variation greater than 14%. For the cases of 
anomalies, by comparing the month prior to the 
inspection with the 6th month after the inspection, 
90% of cases show a variation of at least 10%. In 
the other cases this variation is less than 7.5%. 
The third method used to identify changes in the 
consumption behavior was performing an analysis 
using the standard deviation. For each six months 
history of consumption prior to the inspection, it 
was calculated the average consumption 
(MEANA61) and the associated standard deviation 
(SDVA61). From these two variables, it was created 
a new variable called VAR that is the ratio between 
SDVA61 and MEANA61 
It was observed that the mean of the 
consumption average for cases of fraud is 191 kWh 
and the mean of standard deviations is 53 kWh, 
resulting in a VAR of 30%, for higher or lower, 
which would represent a potential fraud. 
Following the same methodology of analysis, but 
taking the median as a parameter, it reveals that the 
median of the average consumption of fraud cases is 
132 kWh and the median of standard deviations is 
27 kWh, referring to a variation median of 20%. 
The mean for the consumption average of anomaly 
situations is 418 kWh and the mean of standard 
deviation is 106 kWh, resulting in a VAR of 30%. 
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Adopting the median as a parameter, the median 
of the averaged consumption for anomaly cases is 
136 kWh and the median of the standard deviations 
is 26 kWh, referring to a median variation of 17%. 
In cases that are “in order”, the mean of average 
consumption is 385 kWh and the mean of the 
standard deviation is 71 kWh, what results in a VAR 
of 23%. Using the median as a parameter, it shows 
that the median of the average consumption of ''in 
order´´ cases is 191 kWh and the median of the 
standard deviations is 28 kWh, referring to a VAR 
median of 13%. 
Those analysis show that in situations of fraud 
and anomalies, the existence of a step of 
consumption, contributes significantly to a greater 
variation in the calculated standard deviations, 
which are up to 30% to 50% higher compared to 
cases that are “in order”.  
Thus, considering the three analyses for 
detection of potential tampering or anomaly, the 
recommended threshold in this methodology for 
deciding to perform a physical inspection was set as 
difference of 15% between the regular energy meter 
reading and the calculated energy consumption 
using the developed electronic device. 
 
 
5 Methodology of the pre-inspection 
activity 
The following steps were established for the pre-
inspection activity in the theft combat process: 
1. Definition of customers' installations where 
the electronic device will be used, according 
to a list generated by the fraud intelligence 
analysis software and the programmed 
installation optimized route; 
2. Identification of the electronic device that will 
be associated (by the serial number) to each 
customer ID number; 
3. Organize the electronic devices according to 
the optimized route, prepare the vehicle 
(motorcycle or small car) with the safety 
signalization and equipment; 
4. Park the vehicle near the customer house and 
install the safety signalization (if necessary); 
5. Install the corresponding device(s) to the 
customer with the appropriated tool (a 
standard insulated hot stick) on the customer 
external wires; 
6. Take the customer initial customer meter 
reading (on the regular meter) just after the 
electronic device installation; 
7. Remove the electronic device after the 
defined sample period (one week) with the 
appropriated too; 
8. Take the customer final meter reading (on the 
regular meter); 
9. Download the electronic device data and 
compare them to the initial and final regular 
meter readings; 
The computer analysis of the results will 
generate a new list, with the suggested customers 
who deserve to receive a conventional inspection, 
since suggestions these cases indicate high 
probability of frauds or anomalies. To verify the 
feasibility of the proposed pre-inspection activity, 
the AES Eletropaulo connections standards and real 
field situations were analyzed. 
It was verified that the customers connections 
poles have lengths between 3.5 m to 5.5 m and the 
distance between the phases wires are in the range 
of 10 cm to 15 cm. Extensive field tests were done 
and documented on tape by the linesmen of AES 
Eletropaulo and submitted for approval by the 
engineers of the safety committee of the utility 
company. The conclusions indicated that the 
installation/removal of the electronic metering 
device is safe and can be performed in less than 30 s 





Fig. 3 A linesman installing the electronics device in 
a wiring connection of AES Eletropaulo. 
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6 The Ah meter electronic device 
Composed by a hermetically sealed mini-clamp 
current transformer connected to a small 
polycarbonate box, the prototype was designed in 
black to avoid catching the attention of the 
customers. It is known that if a customer who is 
stealing energy notices a new device on his 
installation, there is a great probability that the 
tampering will be temporarily disable to avoid being 
detected. Sometimes the installed equipment can be 
seriously damaged or even destroyed. 
In order to attend the requirements presented in 
Section 2, the electronic device was developed to fit 
a small box (50 mm x 85 mm x 22 mm). This 
housing also allows the device to be easily applied 
(and removed) in the wires near the pole connectors, 
without using a ladder, and by only one person. It is 
worth to notice that the wiring in some poor regions 
is chaotic and the access to the input connections of 
a customer can be difficult, as shown in Fig. 4, 
where a photograph of the wiring around a 
distribution pole is presented. 
 
 
Fig. 4 Wiring of a typical pole connection in a 
poor region of the AES Eletropaulo concession area 
in the city of São Paulo. 
 
A photograph of the assembled printed circuit 
board of the electronic device inside the plastic 
package with the mini-clamp meter is presented in 
Fig. 5. 
 
Fig._5 Photo of the complete meter, with the 
mini-clamp and circuit housed in its final package. 
 
The standard hot stick used by the AES linesmen 
receives a customs tool. In this tool, when the mini 
clamp is inserted, it arms a mechanical trigger 
which is released by the contact of the clamp with 
the wire where it will be installed. Several field tests 
were conducted and this tool transformed an 
operation which was initially imagined to be 
troublesome into a quick, reliable and safe 
operation. The complete device attached to the 
insulated hot stick, ready for being installed, is 
shown in Fig. 6. 
 
 
Fig.6 The mini-clamp meter ready to be installed, in 
the tip of an insulated hot stick used by AES. 
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The mini-clamp current transformer has a ratio 
of 2500:1, and can measure currents up to 100 Arms.
It meets the requirements of the international 
standard IEC 60044-1 Class 1 (error of ± 1.0%). At 
room temperature, the worst case error measured in 
laboratory tests was only ± 0.25%. 
Based on these errors, it is expected that the 
developed measuring device will contribute with a 
typical error of less than ± 0.5%, and a worst case 
error of ± 1.25%, which is more than one order of 
magnitude lower than the value of the trigger 
threshold for indicating theft/anomaly. 
The electric current meter device is based on the 
extremely low power MSP430 microcontroller from 
Texas Instruments with 24 bits Sigma-Delta 
Analogue to Digital Converter (ADC), 512 bytes of 
RAM and 8KB of flash [14]. 
This microcontroller is responsible of the reading 
and also for communication. A crystal driven timer 
in the microcontroller precisely activates the 
measuring process every second. This trigger 
awakes the ADC that operates at 4096 samples per 
second. 
 Next, the microcontroller starts reading the 
values of the analogue-to-digital conversion, 
looking for a zero-crossing of the signal. 
As soon as a zero-crossing is found, the 
microcontroller starts to integrate in time the square 
of the voltage in the output of the ADC. The 
microcontroller continues this integration until the 
seventh zero-crossing is found, what means that 
three whole electrical network cycles have been 
measured. 
At that point, the microcontroller calculates the 
square root of the integration result and multiplies 
the result of the square root by a calibration factor, 
obtained during the calibration of the device. 
The result is the measured electric current in 
RMS. Assuming that this value is the RMS electric 
current for a one second period, this value is then 
integrated every second to obtain the electric current 
consumption in Ampere-seconds. 
The communication between the measuring 
devices and the computer host, which will store the 
data and process the calculations to check for a 
potential fraud or anomaly, is done through a 2.4 
GHz radio, operating at 0 dBm, using a customized 
protocol to guarantee that the radio is kept inactive 
most of the time, which minimizes power 
consumption [15]. A detailed description of the 
hardware is presented in [16]. 
 
 
7 Analysis of the voltage errors in the 
evaluation of the energy 
As mentioned before, because the measuring 
electronic device will use only the electric current to 
calculate the power consumption, it is necessary to 
assume a reference line voltage to calculate the 
energy consumption, and this is done according to 
the type of the client network circuit. To identify a 
reference voltage for the power line, an extensive 
analysis of voltage measurements conducted in all 
concession area of AES Eletropaulo was performed, 
with 9474 measurements of voltages taken between 
the years of 2002 to 2009. 
The analysis was conducted separately for all 
types of connection in the transformer, since there 
are six different types of connections in the network 
of AES Eletropaulo: Delta, Open Delta (lead), Open 
Delta (lag), Closed Delta, Single Phase, Two 
Phases, and Three Phases. The results of the 
statistical analysis showed that the maximum 
deviation from the average value in all cases was 
only ± 3.86% (for the Single Phase connections). 
The worst case standard deviations was σ = 7.0 for 
the average voltage value of 204.9 V in the Open 
Delta (lead) connections, and for the Single Phase 
connections with average voltage value of 117.5 V a 
value of σ = 4.5 was found for the standard 
deviation. 
Therefore, taking into account that the maximum 
error in all types of connections is ± 3.86%, it is 
possible to use the average voltage value of each 
type of connection to calculate the electrical energy 
using the Ah values measured by the electronics 
device within this margin of confidence. 
 
 
8 Analysis of the power factor 
variations in the evaluation of the 
energy 
The power factor (PF) can be an important issue 
when calculating the energy through the measured 
values of current. Thus, part of this study was 
dedicated to realize an statistical analysis of the 
residential and small commercial customers in the 
AES Eletropaulo area, in order to obtain a statistical 
distribution of the power factor. This study, 
obtained with a data base of 4193 customers, 
indicates that when the high power resistive loads 
(represented by the electrical shower, which 
represents 38.8% of the energy bill in an average 
typical house [17] are not taken into account, the 
average power factor of these customers home 
WSEAS TRANSACTIONS on POWER SYSTEMS
L. J. Hernandes Jr., L. C. Duarte, F. O. Morais, 
E. C. Ferreira, J. A. Siqueira Dias
E-ISSN: 2224-350X 86 Issue 2, Volume 7, April 2012
appliances is PF = 0.76, with a variation of ± 9% 
within 2 σ. 
The smallest load among all available electrical 
showers in the Brazilian market has a power of 4.4 
kW, and this results in a current of at least 22 A 
(when installed in a bi-phase connection), the 
developed meter detects when currents higher than 
15 A are turned on (so it can also detect other high 
resistive loads like clothing driers) and integrates 
this current in a separate register. 
Thus, when the pre-inspection is finished, it is 
possible to obtain separately the Ah values of the 
low-current appliances (which have an average 
power factor of 0.76) from the high resistive loads 
(electrical shower and other appliances that drain 
more than 15 A), minimizing the error in the 
calculated energy due to the power factor. 
 
 
9 Data Retrieving and Analysis 
It is expected that, when in full operation, the 
pre-inspection activities will require hundreds or 
even thousands of metering devices will have its 
data retrieved every day in the AES offices for 
analysis. 
Thus, to minimize the reading errors and speed 
up the data reading process, each measuring device 
received a radio circuit that communicates with a 
USB computer wireless device that, when in the 
presence of a measuring device, automatically 
download all the measured data and writes a file that 
is ready to be checked by the fraud detection 
software. 
During this wireless data retrieving, the value of 
the battery voltage is also read and checked, so that 
any device which is reaching the end of its battery's 
life can be replaced. 
 
 
10 Experimental Results 
To evaluate the new proposed inspection routine 
for the detection of energy theft, the new strategy of 
performing a pre-inspection analysis was tested in 
the field. The tests started with selected customers 
who confirmedly were not tampering with the 
meter. The tests were realized in houses with 
substantial difference in the electricity bill, with 
different habits and economic situation, from small 
houses shared by graduated students to very large 
houses in large areas which have with tennis courts, 
swimming pools, etc. 
One of the parameters which require further 
study to establish a valid routine is the sampling 
period. For the utility company, a very short period 
of sampling (for example, three days) would lead to 
a high productivity and allow for a large number of 
pre-inspections for a given number of devices per 
inspection team. 
However, a short period of measurement can 
mask the energy theft depending on the customer's 
habits. For example, if the three days period include 
the week-end, if all the individuals that live in the 
house are away during the week-end, it is likely that 
even if this house has a by-pass in the electric 
shower it would not be identified as being irregular. 
Thus, during the first tests the electronic device 
was left in the customer's installation for at least one 
week. The tests were repeated in many households 
(shown as Test 1 to Test 4) to check for the 
consistency of the results. The results measured in 
these first field tests are presented in Table 2. 
 
           
House 1 is a house shared by several working 
girls who spent the whole day out of home, with the 
following appliances: three refrigerators, five 
electric showers, all lighting provided by cheap, 
low-quality compact fluorescent lamps (with a very 
low power factor PF=0.6), five ceiling fans, seven 
notebooks, one washing machine and one CRT TV 
set. House 2 is a simple house, shared by graduate 
students that spent most of their time at the 
University, with only basic home appliances: a 
refrigerator, two electric showers, incandescent bulb 
lighting, a washing machine, a small CRT TV set 
and three notebooks. House 3 is also simple house, 
with a profile similar to House 2. House 4 is very 
large house, fully equipped with a large number of 
sophisticated home appliances, a lighted tennis 
court, and a swimming pool. 
As it can be noticed, the results measured in all 
tests fell within the expected values (less than 15% 
of difference from the utility meter) indicating that 
the customers are not tampering with the meter and 
there would be no need to perform a physical 
inspection (as it was already known). 
House 2, 3 and 4 presented results which were 
very close to the value read in the regular energy 
meter of the utility company. In House 1 the result 
was also correct, and the observed difference in 
energy consumption between measured values of 
the energy meter and calculated using the Ah 
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reading of the electronics device was because of the 
low power factor of the appliances of this house, 
showing the importance of including the errors due 
to power factor, voltage fluctuation and current 
clamp errors to avoid generating false inspections. 
All AES Eletropaulo inspection teams are now 
being trained and the new routine of pre-inspection 
is already being executed in small scale. It is 
expected that, after many months of practical 
application, the threshold value used today to define 
if a physical inspection is needed or not (currently 
set at 15%) can be optimized based on the field 
results. 
Since the number of physical inspections will be 
dramatically reduced by the pre-inspection activity, 
it is possible in that, in the future, a much lower 
threshold value (for instance, 10%) could be used to 
select customers’ installations which deserve to be 
physically inspected. This would increase the 
number of false results (unnecessary inspections), 
but the system would be able to find customers who 
are stealing a low percentage of their energy bill (at 
10% level), still keeping a good cost/benefit ratio 




A novel methodology and measuring circuits 
necessary to implement a field pre-inspection phase 
in the procedure of finding theft of electrical energy 
is presented. The new technique measures and 
calculates the true RMS time integral of the current 
in the phases of the customer wires installation. 
Using the available data of the typical values of 
the voltage, the consumed energy is calculated and 
compared to the energy registered in the customer's 
standard meter. Laboratory tests showed that the 
developed measuring device presents a very small 
error (less than ± 1.25% in worst case). 
The maximum observed variation in the voltage 
of the lines were ± 3.6%. Statistic studies of the 
power factor in the region of AES Eletropaulo 
indicates that, when the high resistive loads are not 
taken into account, the average values for the power 
factor is 0.76, with a margin of error of ± 9%. 
These errors can be cumulative (all go in the 
same direction), resulting in an uncertainty of ± 
13.85%, so it is expected that all tampering actions 
that present energy theft of more than 15% shall be 
indubitably detected during this pre-inspection 
phase, improving dramatically the efficiency of the 
inspection teams. 
The meter was completely characterized and 
tested in selected customers, presenting excellent 
results. Exhaustive field tests are currently being 
conducted, and the results from some preliminary 
tests realized in controlled customers indicate that 
the introduction of the proposed pre-inspection 
routine will increase substantially the cost/benefit 
ration of the inspection activity. 
It is expected that AES Eletropaulo shall be able 
to achieve an effective reduction in the cost of the 
energy theft detection process and at the same time 
an increase the amount of revenue recovered. 
Genuine customers shall benefit from this 
optimization of the inspection routine because it can 
lead to reduction in tariffs and improvement of the 
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